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BOOK REVIEW
TO STRIKE OR NOT TO STRIKE
JAMES J. BRUDNEY*
JULIUS GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS,
POLITICS, AND PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS (1998).
This book tells a dramatic and tragic story about a labor strike
against the International Paper Company. The strike's primary focus was
a large mill in Jay, Maine, where 1200 employees walked off the job.
The strikers were permanently replaced, the positions they advocated at
the bargaining table were never adopted, the union was subsequently
decertified,I and ten years later many former strikers remain unemployed
or underemployed. Professor Getman2  recounts the facts and
circumstances leading up to the 1987-1988 strike, chronicles the highs and
lows during the actual sixteen month struggle, and relates aftershock
events that continue to affect the economic and psychic well-being of his
books' principal protagonists.
I refer to "protagonists" because every tragedy involves both
protagonist and antagonist perspectives. This tragedy is recounted largely
through the eyes of the rank-and-file workers-employees of the
Androscoggin mill in Jay and leaders of Local Union 14, the local that
oversaw the strike. From their perspective, and Getman's, they faced
three distinct antagonists: the company, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act) 3-in particular its much-maligned permanent replacement
doctrine-and the International Paperworkers Union. The first two
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law, Policy, and Social
Science, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A., Amherst College, 1971; J.D.,
Yale, 1979. I received valuable comments from Victor Brudney, Anne Doyle, Michael
Gottesman, Deborah Merritt, and participants at a University of Texas School of Law
faculty workshop. Elizabeth Pevehouse and the College of Law Library Research staff
provided excellent research assistance. Michele Newton capably typed the manuscript.
1. Decertification of a union under the National Labor Relations Act results when
a majority of the bargaining unit vote that they no longer want to be represented by that
union. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1994).
2. Professor Getman is Earl E. Sheffield Regent's Chair at the University of
Texas School of Law. He previously taught at Yale, Stanford, and Indiana (Bloomington)
law schools, among others.
3. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1994)). I use "NLRA" to refer to the 1935 statute as amended in 1947,
1959, and at other later times.
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antagonists, the company and the law, essentially play the role of
important supporting actors. The most interesting and complex struggle
related here involves an ongoing push-pull relationship between the local
union and the International with which it is affiliated. Using powerful
selections from taped interviews and a tersely informative prose style,
Getman tells a tale in which the doomed ending is pre-ordained but the
pathways traveled are full of gray areas: competing strategic priorities,
subtly misplaced faith in leaders or followers, opportunities unpursued,
and challenges unmet.
In addition to its tragic motif, the book is also a war story. A strike
may be analogized to a limited, conventional war in the pre-nuclear age.
The workers' army must march forward and win battles. It also must be
well supplied, it needs a positive fighting spirit, and it must try to
maintain public interest and support over the long haul. Getman gives us
a strong flavor of how it feels to be waging this war from the inside,
including a lively sense of not being in control of the events themselves.
The bleak results associated with the union effort at International
Paper are hardly unique. Since the early 1980s, a number of high profile
strikes against major corporations have ended in failure.4  These
outcomes give rise to hard questions about the future of organized labor's
fundamental economic weapon. This Review explores two such
questions. The first is whether, under today's social and legal conditions,
a union can "win" a strike against a large national or multinational
corporation' that is prepared to use all options lawfully at its disposal.
The provisional answer that emerges from the saga of Local 14 is no, at
least not when "winning" is understood in conventional engagement-
specific terms. Getman contends the strike could have been won if
certain strategies had been followed. I come away from his narrative
unable to share even this guarded optimism. For me, his greater
contribution is to illustrate how, in an era characterized by decentralized
bargaining and the use of permanent replacements, strikes almost
inevitably succumb to internal contradictions. The second question is
4. See, e.g., AARON BERNSTEIN, GROUNDED: FRANK LORENZO AND THE
DESTRUCTION OF EASTERN AIRLINES (1990) (describing machinists' and pilots' 1989-1990
strike against Eastern Airlines); DAVID HAGE & PAUL KLAUDA, No RETREAT NO
SURRENDER (1989) (describing Minnesota meatpackers' 1985-1986 strike against Hormel
& Co.); JONATHAN D. ROSENBLUM, COPPER CRUCIBLE (1995) (describing Arizona
miners' 1983-1984 strike against Phelps-Dodge Corporation); Steven Greenhouse, Steel
Union Uses Indy 500 to Press its Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1996, § 1, at 19
(describing rubber workers' 1994-1995 strike against Bridgestone).
5. As Getman tells us, International Paper at the time was the richest paper
company in the world and the largest private landowner in the United States. See JULIUS
GETMAN, THE BETRAYAL OF LOCAL 14: PAPERWORKERS, POLITICS, AND PERMANENT
REPLACEMENTS 41 (1998).
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whether something else qualifies as "winning" or "prevailing" in such
desperate circumstances. The workers at the Jay, Maine, plant bloomed
as individuals and coalesced as a community because of the strike.
Individually, they used energy and creativity many did not know they
had. Collectively, they came to understand and rely upon one another for
strength. An implicit message of the book is that, although these
triumphs of individual and collective spirit were inextricably linked to the
experience of crushing economic defeat, the victories must somehow
transcend the loss if the union movement is ever again to have creative
and redistributive force in our country.
I first offer an overview of Getman's narrative itself-what happened
to the members of Local 14. In presenting this story, I amplify the role
played by the permanent replacement doctrine. I then examine the two
questions I found especially intriguing about the plight of Local 14 and
its members. In considering whether contemporary strikes are winnable,
and, if not, whether workers can find suitably empowering alternative
measures, I attempt to situate the strike at International Paper in the
broader context of challenges facing organized labor.
I. THE PATHWAYS TO DEFEAT
The book is an outgrowth of Getman's testimony in the spring of
1990, as a labor law scholar reviewing a Senate bill that proposed to ban
the use of permanent replacements during an economic strike.6 At the
Senate hearing, Getman met Tom Pratt, a former International Paper
striker who also was testifying before the Senate Committee.7 He
conducted preliminary interviews with Pratt and former Local 14
President Dick Meserve in Maine that spring. He followed up with
scores of other interviews over the next four years, talking with strikers,
replacement workers, town officials, and representatives from the
company and the International Union as well.8 One of the author's true
gifts is his ability to let these voices come through unembellished. In
reading of their joy and their pain, we get an almost audible and visual
sense of what they experienced.
The background events leading up to the strike are a microcosm for
the decline of labor-management relations in the industrial sector. Jay,
6. See Preventing Replacement of Economic Strikers: Hearing on S. 2112 Before
the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 106 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]. I served at the time as chief counsel
and staff director for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, and on behalf of the
Subcommittee I invited Professor Getman to testify.
7. See id. at 13.
8. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at xii-xiii.
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Maine is a small town in the western part of the state. The lives of its
residents had revolved for decades around papermaking. International
Paper was unionized in the 1930s, when the company voluntarily
recognized the Paperworkers' Union to avoid having to deal with a more
radical CIO union. 9
The mill in Jay opened in the early 1960s. The initial two decades
of collective bargaining agreements resulted in unions securing steadily
improved wages and benefits and greater control over job classifications.
Because U.S. paper manufacturers occupied a strong position in world
markets, labor costs were passed along to consumers.' 0 Local 14 in Jay
was honest but had no grass roots tradition. A minority of bargaining
unit members were active in the union, and meetings were sparsely
attended except around contract negotiation time.I Although the
International grouped a number of locals together into "multiples" in
order to increase bargaining leverage, the Jay local opted out of the
multiples. Bargaining on their own, local union leaders used the multiple
agreements as a floor and usually secured three percent above that for
their members.
By the 1980s, International Paper, like many other large U.S.
corporations, was no longer satisfied with the traditional collective
bargaining model. Having lost its price and cost advantages to foreign
competition, International Paper sought major concessions in labor
negotiations. At the same time, International Union officers perceived the
new generation of corporate executives at International Paper as not just
pushing for concessions but hoping to oust the union. 2 The 1983
negotiations at Jay were long and arduous. Over the next three years,
management sought greater control over job rules and work assignments,
and the union filed more grievances and took more of them to
arbitration. 1
In the Spring of 1987, International Paper submitted tough contract
proposals at Jay: elimination of the Sunday premium and the Christmas
holiday shutdown, the right to subcontract maintenance work (putting 350
jobs at risk), and a new program requiring employees to work outside
their job categories.' 4 During bargaining, management was inflexible
and refused to explain or justify its positions." Workers and their union
leaders became more militant in response to this refusal to talk. The Jay
9. See id. at 12.
10. See id. at 10-11.
11. See id. at 12.
12. See id. at 16.
13. See id. at 22.
14. See id. at 32.
15. See id. at 35.
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local for the first time entered into a joint pool arrangement with locals
at mills in three other states that were negotiating with International
Paper; workers also voted to authorize a strike. After a resounding
ninety-two percent "No" vote on the Company's final offer at the June 12
local union meeting, the strike began in Jay on June 15, 1987.
International Paper, anticipating and perhaps even desiring a strike,
had begun advertising for replacement workers in Maine newspapers one
week before the June 12 rejection vote. Also prior to the strike's
commencement, the Company brought in thirty large trailers to house
replacements and built a barbed wire fence around the mill.16
International Paper actually began employing permanent replacements on
June 29, two weeks after the strike began.17
For those unfamiliar with the intricacies of labor law, the permanent
replacement doctrine needs a bit of unpacking. Although the right to
strike in support of economic demands is a protected activity under the
NLRA, 18 the Supreme Court, in the 1938 case of NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co. ,'9 stated in dicta that an employer had the right
to fill the places left vacant by strikers in order to "protect and continue
his business," and that the employer could treat those replacements as
permanent employees so as to displace workers who had participated in
the strike.' Permanent replacement is not quite the same thing as
discharge: a permanently replaced striker in a unionized setting remains
a member of the bargaining unit for an extended period, eligible for recall
to fill job vacancies and also eligible to vote on union matters." Still,
the fact that a twenty year employee who exercises his protected right to
strike can lawfully lose his job on a permanent basis is widely regarded
as the single biggest anomaly in the NLRA.
For decades after it was announced by the Supreme Court, the
Mackay doctrine prompted considerable scholarly criticism,' but
16. See id. at 36.
17. See Senate Hearing, supra note 6, at 129.
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
19. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
20. Id. at 345-46.
21. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968) (holding that economic striker
is entitled to reinstatement to vacant position); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1994) (stating that
economic strikers remain eligible to vote on bargaining unit matters for 12 months after
commencement of strike).
22. See, e.g., Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers, 35 ILL. L. REV. 817,
830-32 (1941); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301-02
(1978); George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a
Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEx. L. REV. 378, 383 (1969); Note,
Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 634, 639-41 (1966).
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empirical studies indicate it had little practical effect.3 Employers were
reluctant to use the permanent replacement approach for a number of
reasons. In the early days of the NLRA, unions were able to exert
secondary economic pressures by picketing, boycotting, or striking the
struck employer's suppliers and customers. 2 Thus the employer who
hired permanent replacements ran a substantial risk of becoming
economically isolated. Even after Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley
amendments in 1947, 2 management tended to view productivity as
linked to having an experienced workforce that featured both stable tenure
and high morale. Employers were reluctant to jeopardize those assets by
relying on a strategy as confrontational as the hiring of permanent
replacements. 26 Employers also feared that they would be unable to
secure outside replacement labor.27 Further, employers had an incentive
to maintain an image as corporate "good citizens." Unions were
perceived by the general public as beneficial institutions until the late
1970s. 28 Managers generally had long-term ties to their communities,
and most employers saw it as socially unacceptable to banish employees
who had spent years contributing to the company over a temporary, albeit
intense, economic dispute.29
23. See CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL., OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY
EXPERIENCE, NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS at iii, 38, 64, 123
(1982) (identifying use of permanent replacements during strikes as "a relatively new
phenomenon," and explaining that firms studied were reluctant to resort to the use of
outside replacements); see also William Serrin, Industries, in Shift, Aren't Letting Strike
Stop Them, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1986, at A18 (quoting management and union
representatives as agreeing that use of permanent replacements was a rarity before 1980s).
24. Under the Wagner Act, only employer labor practices were regulated; it was
not until nine years after Mackay Radio that Congress outlawed secondary pressure by
unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1994).
25. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994)).
26. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 23, at 38, 64 (discussing employers' fear of
antagonizing unions and workers).
27. See id. (discussing employers' fear of failure as a constraint on efforts to hire
replacement workers).
28. Gallup Poll results indicate that the general public's confidence in organized
labor has declined steadily since 1977. See Leslie McAneny & David W. Moore,
American Confidence in Public Institutions Rises, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, May 1995,
at 11-13 (reporting that percentage of public expressing "great deal of confidence" or
"quite a lot of confidence" in labor unions has declined from 39% in 1977 to 30% in
1984, and to 26% in 1995); Frank Newport, Confidence in Institutions: Small Business
and the Military Generate Most Confidence in Americans, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Aug.
1997, at 33 (reporting public's confidence in organized labor has further eroded to 23 %).
29. See Serrin, supra note 23 (reporting that from the 1950s through the 1970s,
managers did not view hiring replacements as socially acceptable). See generally S. REP.
No. 103-110, at 6-8 (1993) (discussing the limited use of permanent replacements prior
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Since 1980, employers have substantially increased their resort to
permanent replacements during economic strikes.3 ° Again, a number of
different factors come into play. President Reagan's permanent
replacement of 12,000 striking air traffic controllers in 1981 dramatically
affected the way the American public and many American employers
viewed strikes. 3' Although that strike by federal employees was illegal,
a. new generation of corporate managers regarded the President's action,
and the popular support it received, as an invitation to pursue more
aggressive responses to lawful strikes. Perhaps equally important, the
1980s witnessed major changes in the structure and mobility of corporate
capital. Faced with high debts or saddled with inefficient enterprises,
new management at times seemed to treat newly acquired workers as
mere assets to be jettisoned or abandoned.32 Corporate managers may
to 1980).
30. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Labor-Management Relations: Strikes and
the Use of Strike Replacements in the 1970s and 1980s, GAO HRD-91-2 (1991) (reporting
that employers hired permanent replacements in 17% of strikes in 1985 and 1989; that 4%
of all striking workers were permanently replaced in those years; and that employers
threatened to hire permanent replacements before or during 33% of strikes in those two
years); Cynthia L. Gramm, Empirical Evidence on Political Arguments Relating to
Replacement Worker Legislation, 42 LAB. L.J. 491, 492 (1991) (reporting that for strikes
covering 1000 or more workers between 1984 and 1988, 15.6% of national firms and
23.8% of New York firms used permanent replacements); see also BNA Special Report:
1999 Employer Bargaining Objectives (BNA) 4-5 (1998) (reporting that roughly half of
manufacturing businesses in 1998 were very likely or somewhat likely to hire
replacements if firm were struck; of employers "very likely" to hire replacements, 55%
would make them permanent).
31. See, e.g., Harris Poll Finds Most Oppose the Air Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 1981, at A18 (reporting Harris Survey results that majority of adults contacted, 69%,
percent, felt that the Reagan Administration "had a right to dismiss the controllers");
Serrin, supra note 23 (describing President Reagan's action as "[an important signal to
employers that hiring replacements could not only be effective but could be widely viewed
as acceptable conduct"); see also Helen Thomas, Reagan: Standing Firm Against PATCO,
U.P.I. Sept. 2, 1981 (reporting that White House chief of staff expressed the President's
"concern[ I that the message might be lost on other unions" if striking air traffic
controllers were allowed to return to their jobs).
32. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 71-78 (describing how Frank Lorenzo
in 1987 and 1988 initiated a series of sales and spinoffs at Eastern Airlines, stripping
money and resources from the' company and eliminating large numbers of union jobs);
Bridget O'Brian & Thomas- Petzinger Jr., Going for Broke: Bankruptcy Strategy for
Eastern Airlines Could Fail Lorenzo, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at 1 (discussing how
Lorenzo thrust Continental Airlines into bankruptcy in 1983 and broke the unions, and
reporting on his plans to pursue a similar strategy with Eastern six years later); see also
RICHARD VIGILANTE, STRIKE: THE DAILY NEws WAR AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
LABOR 16, 25, 258-64 (1994) (describing unsuccessful efforts by the Tribune Company
in the 1980s to extract major concessions from unions at the New York Daily News, and
company's inability during the same period to sell the News because prospective buyers
1999:65
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well have perceived ongoing relationships with a recently acquired
workforce or a local community as less important than short-run
economic returns.33 Finally, the fact that Congress in the Taft-Hartley
and Landrum-Griffin' amendments had restricted unions in their use of
secondary economic weapons meant that employers were not only
permitted to hire permanent replacements, they were legally insulated
from responsive economic pressure tactics formerly available to organized
workers.35
When a company hires permanent replacements, as International
Paper did almost immediately in Jay, the stakes are raised considerably.
A strike that began as a limited dispute about working conditions becomes
a broader confrontation about the right of all striking workers to retain
their jobs. Unions faced with permanent replacement of their members
almost invariably insist on reinstatement as a condition to settlement of
the strike. Resolution of this job security issue creates legal and
psychological challenges well beyond the economic dispute that originally
divided the parties. Moreover, when an employer like International Paper
hires permanent replacements, it effectively tells the workers that it does
not expect them to return. The workers, in response, may rationally
conclude that their interests are no longer congruent with the long-term
prosperity of their former employer. Ordinarily, even striking workers
will feel constrained in their use of lawful self-help measures that threaten
the company's ultimate market position. Once permanently replaced,
however, these workers may feel impelled to reject such constraints; they
may conclude that only a more pervasive campaign to force the
company's sale or its replacement of top management will offer them a
chance at reemployment.
Getman recounts that Local 14, with support from the International,
relied on a range of complementary tactics in an effort to pressure
International Paper and win the strike. It is noteworthy that certain
could not secure sufficiently large union concessions; and reporting that the purchaser who
stepped in during a bitter strike in early 1991 was able to secure concessions, including
the loss of over one-third of jobs, which were larger in some respects than what Tribune
Company had demanded).
33. See generally John Schmeltzer, Key Management Weapon: Threat to Replace
Workers, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1997, at 13 (reporting that since 1981 permanent
replacements have become a "regular consideration within a corporation's arsenal of
weapons" in response to a strike); Serrin, supra note 23 (describing ascent of new
generation of managers willing to hire permanent replacements as part of cost-cutting
efficiencies).
34. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
35. See generally S. REP. No. 103-110, at 13-15 (1993) (discussing the increased
use of permanent replacements since 1980).
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traditional approaches once employed by striking unions proved
ineffective or were cast aside. Picket lines were set up, but they were
unsuccessful either at stemming the movement of goods or supplies, or at
preventing entry by replacements and crossovers. 6 These picket lines
also generated violence and bad press in the early weeks of the strike.
Nonviolent civil disobedience was contemplated, but the local union
executive board rejected this technique based on fear of legal liability."7
Instead, Local 14 developed a combination of four distinct yet
overlapping tactical approaches. One was to expand the pool concept to
bargaining with International Paper by enlisting other Paperworkers' local
unions in the strike when their agreements expired.3" Strike leaders
anticipated that if locals around the country would reject the company's
concessionary proposals and join the pool, then over the ensuing six to
twelve months the strike would do far greater damage to International
Paper's national production. A second tactic was to engage in outreach
to the media and the larger community in an effort to present forcefully
and responsibly the union's case against International Paper. By
organizing a food bank that involved local businesses, conducting frequent
local rallies and marches, taking strong stands against violence whenever
tensions seemed about to explode, and seeking out the media to
communicate its positions, the union attempted over a period of months
to broaden interest among and win support from the general public.
A third tactical decision was to initiate a corporate campaign against
International Paper. "Corporate campaign" has become a broadly defined
term of art within the organized labor movement. Such campaigns
involve a union's application of various pressure tactics, such as consumer
actions, sophisticated public relations techniques, or lobbying a firm's
creditors or lenders, that are directed at business priorities or decisions
outside the labor relations arena. 9 By applying such pressure against a
firm's executives and top policymakers, the union hopes to produce a
36. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 51, 53.
37. See id. at 67-68.
38. See id. at 55.
39. See generally INDUSTRIAL UNION DEP'T, AFL-CIO, DEVELOPING NEW
TACTICS: WINNING WITH COORDINATED CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 4-10 (1985) [hereinafter
DEVELOPING NEW TACTICS] (listing as suitable campaign tactics: (1) building coalitions
with other groups; (2) public relations activities designed to raise community awareness
of company positions; (3) legislative initiatives; (4) appeals to regulatory agencies; (5)
litigation; (6) consumer actions; (7) pressuring creditors and lenders; (8) withdrawals of,
or threats to withdraw, pension fund assets; (9) shareholder actions; and (10) in-plant
actions).
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conciliatory response regarding firm practices that affect the organizing
or bargaining objectives of the union.'
At Local 14's instigation, the International hired Ray Rogers, an
outside consultant with a national reputation, to spearhead the campaign.
A key goal was to disrupt International Paper's connections to
corporations with which it shared board members.4' Through letter-
writing campaigns and large, spirited demonstrations and rallies across
New England, workers sought to force International Paper directors off
the corporate boards of Bank of Boston, Coca-Cola, and Avon Products,
among others. They also called for a boycott of these companies in an
effort to pressure or embarrass them into cutting off their relationship
with International Paper.42
Finally, and partly in conjunction with the corporate campaign, the
union and workers mounted a major environmental effort against
International Paper's waste disposal practices.43  The Company's
environmental performance had never been terribly good, but in the past,
the union and state and local officials had looked the other way. The
leaks, spills, and dumping were seen as part of International Paper's cost
of doing business. Now, though, the strikers pressured federal OSHA
and state environmental officials for more rigorous enforcement;" they
persuaded local officials to pass a restrictive licensing ordinance;45 and
they attracted national figures like Ralph Nader to criticize International
Paper's disregard for the environment.'
Over a period of sixteen months there were occasions when one or
more of these tactics yielded tangible results. The workers gradually won
considerable support from the local community and the Maine media, no
small accomplishment given that initial press coverage had focused
heavily on worker violence.47  The corporate campaign led to
participation and endorsement from state and national political leaders.4"
And the environmental campaign, aided by a fortuitously timed major gas
leak into the atmosphere, was particularly effective at putting International
40. See, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM 171-72 (1988);
THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 195-97 (1986); Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union' Corporate
Campaigns: An Assessment, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505, 506 (1990).
41. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 123.
42. See id. at 130.
43. See id. at 80-81.
44. See id. at 80.
45. See id. at 98.
46. See id. at 144.
47. See id. at 67.
48. See id. at 90.
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Paper on the defensive and bringing company leadership back to the
bargaining table.' 9
In the end, however, Local 14 failed in its principal objectives:
regaining jobs for its members and resisting International Paper's
concessionary demands. The International Union and its national
membership did not consistently reinforce each foray proposed by Local
14. Workers at other plants, especially plants that had been rumored to
be in economic trouble, never came to view the strike as their fight, and
were not keen to jeopardize their jobs by joining the proposed new
pool.' The International Union leadership, while generally supportive
of the strikers, was less aggressive and innovative in drawing up battle
plans. The leadership worried about members in other locals, and also
about International Union representatives outside Maine who over a
period of months wanted fewer resources devoted to the International
Paper battle. In addition, International Union leaders had seen other
unions in recent years decimated by failed strikes against major
corporations. From this broader and more fearful perspective, the
International's strategic instincts were to try and minimize losses rather
than to wage all-out economic warfare.
The company was clever at exposing and exploiting tensions between
the militant Local and the more cautious International. Perhaps the
crucial example of this occurred in late March 1988, nine months into the
strike.5' Responding to longstanding union interest in getting back to the
table, International Paper officials offered to reopen national negotiations
if the union would call off the corporate/environmental campaign. The
International promptly accepted the offer and canceled the campaign; after
two weeks of frustrating and unsuccessful talks, it was then difficult to
regenerate the momentum that had been driving the local union effort.
The state of the law was also a major weapon in International Paper's
hands. The company's negotiating position during those key two weeks
in March 1988 was to offer every striker reinstatement within
International Paper over the ensuing twelve months as well as retraining,
job counseling, and special retirement incentives, but not to let them
return to their actual jobs in Jay.52 By deciding that the permanent
replacement workers should remain permanently ensconced, thereby
requiring strikers to leave their own community and the fellowship of
their comrades in order to regain economic security, International Paper
49. See id. at 144.
50. See id. at 55-58.
51. See id. at 144.
52. See id. at 150-51.
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proposed a solution that was overwhelmingly rejected as punitive and
manipulative.
When the strike ultimately was called off in October 1988, the
NLRA effectively forced Local 14 to live through two gut-wrenching
experiences which constitute the story's denouement. First, the local
union leadership agreed to end the strike by sending a telegram to
International Paper rather than taking a vote among its members.53 This
decision gave strikers immediate access to any mill vacancies existing at
the time: the "right of access" is one of the morsels of the permanent
replacement doctrine that distinguishes "replacement" from
"discharge."' But in reaching for this morsel, Local 14 leaders had to
acknowledge their concurrent fear that if a public meeting had been
convened to vote on ending the strike, some strikers would have crossed
over before the vote in order to be rehired. After sending the telegram,
the Local leaders held a bitter meeting with their own dispirited and angry
supporters, to explain why they had trusted the membership to vote for
the strike and to man the front lines in the sixteen month battle, yet would
not give them a chance to vote on ending the strike, out of fear that too
many members would "cut and run."55
The second law-induced cruelty suffered by strikers was the election
to decertify the union. Once some of the replacements filed a petition to
have the union decertified, former strikers confronted the choice of
whether to soften their hatred of "scabs" in order to try to retain the
union as exclusive representative inside the plant.56 If the union were
removed, access to future vacancies would effectively become a matter of
company discretion. The long-term interest of the ex-strikers was thus to
extend olive branches to the men and women who had previously been
targeted by Local 14, in an effort to persuade these newcomers that the
union was now its ally. The effort failed miserably: the ex-strikers
lacked stomach to put up a convincing case, and even with more than 300
ex-strikers having been rehired by the time of the 1992 election, the union
was decertified by a vote of 660 to 380. Two subsequent elections to re-
introduce the union have failed as well, though the margin of defeat is
down to 100 votes.57
53. See id. at 175-76.
54. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), discussed supra at note 21
and accompanying text.
55. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 181-83.
56. See id. at 192-200.
57. See id. at 200.
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II. HARD QUESTIONS ,
The first of the two issues identified earlier was the impossibility of
"winning" a strike today, at least when, as is often the case, the employer
hires or threatens to hire permanent replacements. Historically, the
economic strike has been the foundation for trade unionism in this
country. Collective withholding of labor is meant to impose "moral
intimidation" 8 on customers and economic hardship on the employer's
business. The threat of a strike is often the primary force driving both
parties to the bargaining table to settle their differences. Over 125 years
the law evolved from treating strikes as criminal conspiracies,59 illegal
restraints on interstate commerce,' and enjoinable torts,6' to according
them qualified protected status under the NLRA. a But as the lacuna of
permanent replacements has expanded in recent decades, certain internal
contradictions of the contemporary strike have come into focus.
The permanent replacement of strikers ups the ante on both sides.
Instead of the comparable risks that used to exist, such as temporary lost
wages and temporarily reduced profits, management now inflicts an
enduring and transformative economic harm on the company's own
workforce. The predictable response of affected strikers is to pursue a
broader, deeper offensive against the company: to attempt to inflict
serious economic injury on management's business operations beyond the
strike site. This natural escalation by local striking workers threatens the
leadership of the international union, both in its short-term tactics and its
long-term vision. In the short term, workers at the firm's other
operations are not comparably alienated from the company and are not
ready to take comparable risks. Efforts to bring the company to its
58. C)' Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (Mass. 1896) (describing how
worker patrols impose a "moral intimidation" on others seeking to continue as
employees).
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pullis (Phila. Mayor's Ct. 1806), in 3 A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59, 66, 236 (John R.
Commons et al. eds., 1910) (reporting indictment and jurors' verdict, finding that strike
by shoemakers in Philadelphia was a common law criminal conspiracy); People v. Melvin,
2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 262, 281-82 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 1810) (reporting conviction of
striking journeymen shoemakers in New York).
60. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (holding that striking hatters could
be sued for damages under Sherman Antitrust Act).
61. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (holding that
strike by machinists could be enjoined). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 17-24, 33-35 (1930) (describing widespread use of
injunctions in strike setting during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994) (providing that nothing in the Act shall interfere
with or impede or diminish the right to strike or affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right).
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economic knees do not sit well with workers who still have something left
to lose. One ironic piece of evidence from this story is that the corporate
campaign run by Local 14 called for a boycott of companies sharing a
director with International Paper, but not a boycott of International Paper
itself.63  The international union leadership viewed a "boycott
International Paper strategy" as unacceptably injurious to its own
members.
In the longer term, an industrial union like the Paperworkers views
itself as a fighting force that must wage many battles with different
companies over an extended period of time amidst dynamic changes in
world market conditions. While an occasional scorched earth campaign
may help bring other companies to the table,' an extended commitment
to such tactics against vastly superior resources is likely to be an exercise
in self-immolation. Wayne Glenn, the International Union president and
the weak-kneed villain from Getman's perspective, refers to his
philosophy as one of "restrained battle."' Getman expresses mild
contempt for this top-down exercise of restraint,' but he does not really
acknowledge the severely pinched realities facing a national union in
today's global market setting.
I am not suggesting the International is immune from criticism for
its judgment calls. Getman is most persuasive when he contends that
international union leaders have overvalued professionalism: they want
their trained staff to handle too many matters and they do not understand
or accept the importance of greater rank-and-file visibility and
involvement in the various campaigns.67 But I was unconvinced by his
suggestion that the strikers had a decent chance to win at the table if the
International had followed the Local's innovative instincts and supported
a simultaneous full-court press on all four fronts.' Instead, his
description of the struggle against a powerful corporation and a hostile
legal environment left me with the belief that the problem is close to
intractable, and that a solution does not depend on whether the workers
adopt more participatory leadership techniques and philosophies.
In this regard, it is useful to view the strike experience at
International Paper in a broader social context. The 1980s witnessed a
63. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 130-31.
64. See id. at 207-08.
65. See id. at 208.
66. See id. at 157, 208, 221-23.
67. See id. at 223.
68. See id. at 157-58. As noted earlier, these four fronts involved expanding the
pool concept of bargaining to other International Paper locals, engaging in outreach to the
media and larger community, initiating a corporate campaign, and pressuring agencies to
take environmental action against the company.
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substantial departure from the industry-wide or "pattern" bargaining
approach that had characterized major unionized industries since shortly
after World War II.'9 Firms faced with rising costs and stiff global
competition expressed an individualized need for both wage concessions
and flexible job classifications, and a consequent unwillingness to
negotiate agreements that applied uniformly to most or all firms in an
industry,7' or even most or all facilities within a firm.71
As bargaining structures became more decentralized, there were
increased opportunities for tension and disagreement on bargaining
priorities between the leadership of an international union and its
constitutive local union members. Substantively, international
leadership's interest in maintaining solidarity-even if that meant agreeing
to concessions-often clashed with the democratic priorities of local
unions seeking to resist or minimize changes in the economic status
quo.'72 Tactically, local unions that struck often simultaneously
69. See, e.g., Audrey Freedman & William E. Fulmer, Last Rites for Pattern
Bargaining, 60 HARV. Bus. REV. 30 (1982); Daniel G. Gallagher & Cynthia L. Gramm,
Collective Bargaining and Strike Activity, in THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
HANDBOOK, PART II 65, 66-67 (David Lewin et al. eds., 1997).
70. See, e.g., ROSENBLUM, supra note 4 at 105-07, 218-19 (describing the
breakdown of pattern bargaining in copper industry); Freedman & Fulmer, supra note 69,
at 40 (describing the breakdown of pattern bargaining in auto and rubber industries);
Harry C. Katz, The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and
Comparative Analysis, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 11 (1993) (reporting abandonment
of pattern bargaining in steel industry).
71. See, e.g., Gallagher & Gramm, supra note 69, at 67 (discussing
decentralization from firm-wide to less than firm-wide bargaining structures); Katz, supra
note 70, at 11 (describing shifts to plant level bargaining and away from firm-wide
agreements in auto, tire, and airline industries).
72. Commentators have described international unions' willingness to bend or
adjust during the 1980s with varying degrees of sympathy. Compare, e.g., HAGE &
KLAUDA, supra note 4, at 383 (contending that Local P-9 at Hormel wanted to preserve
pattern bargaining based on Hormel as a high-wage packing company while UFCW
leaders saw need to focus on low-wage companies in their industry) and id. at 388-89
(contrasting unions' frequent willingness to adapt to sobering economic realities in 1980s
with rigid resistance to change by Local P-9 at Hormel), with PETER RACHLEFF, HARD-
PRESSED IN THE HEARTLAND: THE HORMEL STRIKE AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT 107-08 (1993) (criticizing international union leadership for failure to replace
traditional "business unionism" with a more participatory and aggressive model after
collapse of pattern bargaining in 1980s). Of course, such tension between union leaders
and members over economic issues is hardly unprecedented. See generally JEREMY
BRECHER, STRIKE! 279-80 (1972) (predicting that in a deteriorating economy, union
leaders may feel obliged to accept concessions and work adjustments, rank-and-file
members may resist such adjustments, and prolonged strikes may help ease intra-union
pressures); Gallagher & Gramm, supra note 69, at 70-71 (reviewing "faulty information"
analyses of strike behavior that portray strikes as a tool used by union leaders in intra-
organizational bargaining with their members). But employers' newfound willingness to
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promoted innovative and participatory involvement in a corporate
campaign, while international leaders displayed caution or even skepticism
regarding such efforts to broaden and deepen particularized industrial
disputes.' At Phelps-Dodge, international union leadership resisted
local union requests for a corporate campaign and the union lost the
strike.' At Hormel, the local union initiated and waged a corporate
campaign despite opposition from the international leadership, and the
results were disastrous.75 By comparison, local and international union
leaders waged the corporate campaign at International Paper with relative
equanimity, notwithstanding Getman's portrayal of the uneasiness in their
alliance. The outcome, however, was no more successful than what had
been achieved by copper miners in Arizona or meatpackers in Minnesota.
An empirical study of corporate campaigns in the 1980s indicates that
campaigns launched as a strike complement have regularly yielded
disappointing results, and indeed have fared worse than campaigns
initiated as strike substitutes or as part of an organizing drive.76 The
study's authors suggest that the crisis atmosphere accompanying strike
complement campaigns may impose undue constraints on a union's ability
to plan effectively for such an effort.7
The demise of union solidarity is, of course, not simply a function
of divisive internal union politics. As bargaining has become increasingly
fragmented, employers have become more willing to whipsaw the union
during the bargaining process, and to rely on permanent replacements
when workers strike in opposition to demands for firm-specific or plant-
specific variation in their terms and conditions of employment.7' During
hire permanent replacements means that such tension is far more likely to have fatal
consequences in terms of workers' job security.
73. See Jarley & Maranto, supra note 40, at 517 (discussing how aggressive local
union officials have relied on independent labor consulting groups to initiate corporate
campaigns despite national union policy discouraging such action).
74. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 4 at 166-69 (describing how Steelworkers'
International Union leadership rejected proposed corporate campaign during Phelps-Dodge
strike).
75. See HAGE & KLAUDA, supra note 4, at 99-103, 333-46, 368-69 (describing
Local P-9's action to initiate campaign in face of suspicion and resistance from UFCW
leadership, and subsequent action by UFCW placing the Local in trusteeship and
negotiating a contract that did not meet the campaign's goals).
76. See Jarley & Maranto, supra note 40, at 505, 511-12, 519 (examining results
associated with 28 corporate campaigns, and finding that organizing-related campaigns
were more likely to yield gains for the union than bargaining-related campaigns, and that
strike complement campaigns resulted in the largest number of complete failures).
77. See id. at 519.
78. See, e.g., HAGE & KLAUDA, supra note 4 at 380-81 (discussing Hormel's
success at whipsawing Local P-9 with aid of replacement workers); Gallagher & Gramm,
supra note 69, at 67 (discussing employer efforts to whipsaw unions during bargaining
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the 1980s and early 1990s, employers successfully resorted to the use of
permanent replacements in numerous high-profile strikes.' An
important byproduct of this permanent replacement strategy has been a
precipitous fall in the frequency of strikes by organized labor. Major
strikes in the 1990s have declined by almost seventy percent when
compared with the early 1980s, and by nearly ninety percent when
compared with the 1970s. Taken together, decentralization of the
bargaining process and employers' willingness to brandish the permanent
replacement weapon seem to have rendered the economic strike
anomalous and inconsequential as a tactic for improving working
conditions.
Unions and their allies have strenuously maintained that the law must
be changed, that Congress should override Mackay Radio and restore a
level playing field. Over a four year period in the early 1990s, a clear
process). In addition to employers' development of more aggressive bargaining and
strike-response strategies, larger factors have contributed to the steady decline in union
density over the past four decades. See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World
of Competitive Product Markets, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (1993) (discussing role played
by the rise of competitive global markets); James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action
and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996) (discussing role played by
emergence of an individual rights-based legal culture); Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The
Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's Decline, 16
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133 (1998) (discussing role played by a shift in societal
values and attitudes from utilitarian to expressive individualism).
79. Apart from the strike at International Paper, strikes that drew national
attention and involved employer reliance on permanent replacements included Greyhound
in 1983 (6000 workers replaced); Continental Airlines in 1985 (8000 workers replaced);
Eastern Airlines in 1989 (7000 workers replaced); The New York Daily News in 1991 (800
permanent replacements hired); and Bridgestone Tire Co. in 1994 (2300 permanent
replacements hired). See S. REP. No. 103-110, at 11-13 (1993) (reporting replacement
worker data for Greyhound, Continental, and Eastern); David E. Pitt, News Strikers Ease
Stance on a Big Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1991, at Bi (reporting replacement worker
figures for Daily News); Greenhouse, supra note 4 (reporting replacement worker figures
for Bridgestone); see also Cindy Richards, Cat Invites All UAW Strikers Back to Work,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 17, 1992, at 45 (reviewing how Caterpillar Inc. stunned the UAW
by announcing that it would hire permanent replacements if strikers did not return to work
within five days, and how the union called off the strike in response to this threat).
80. See Fehmida Sleemi, 1997 Work Stoppages, COMPENSATION AND WORKING
CONDITIONS, Summer 1998, at 50 (reporting annual major work stoppage data, indicating
that strikes involving 1000 workers or more declined from 289 per year during 1970s to
114 per year in 1980-1984, 52 per year in 1985-1989, and 37 per year in 1990-1997);
Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract
Negotiations: The U.S. Experience, 1980-1989, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 667, 667 (1998)
(reporting Bureau of Labor Statistics evidence that overall strike activity declined by more
than 50% from the 1970s to the 1980s); id. at 699 (concluding that increases in the risk
of worker replacement significantly reduces likelihood that union will engage in strike or
threaten to strike).
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majority in both Houses of Congress subscribed to precisely that position.
But majority support for NLRA reform fell victim to the supermajority
demands imposed under modern Senate practice. In 1991-1992 and again
in 1993-1994, the House by substantial vote margins passed a bill
overriding Mackay and banning the permanent replacement of economic
strikers. 8 On each occasion, a Senate majority fell several votes short
of the sixty needed to invoke cloture. 82 In an era of crowded legislative
calendars and limited supplies of political capital, the Mackay issue may
not be seriously revisited for many years to come. Future prospects are
especially daunting given the enhanced power that can be wielded by a
minority of pro-business Senators. Since the early 1970s, when the
Senate leadership adopted its two-track system for handling debate, it has
been easier to mount a filibuster because other floor business can move
forward while cloture proceedings are pursued simultaneously on a
separate track.8 3 Unless the Senate returns to its prior practice of
forcing filibustering members to occupy the floor and block all other
business, an unlikely scenario to most congressional observers, there
seems to be little realistic chance for a legislative solution.
Alternatively, unions may need to develop a more effective pre-strike
strategy. If the workers at Jay had foreseen the "divide and conquer"
approach of International Paper, they might have embraced the idea of a
multi-plant bargaining pool at an earlier period. Then they would not
have been asking workers in Ohio and Arkansas for commitments they
themselves had been unwilling to make before their conflict with
International Paper arose.' More broadly, if workers in an industry like
81. See 137 CONG. REc. 18,655 (1991) (recording House approval of bill to ban
permanent replacements by a vote of 247 to 182); 139 CONG. REC. 12,866 (1993)
(recording House approval of bill to ban permanent replacements by 239-190).
82. See 138 CONG. REC. 14,875 (1992) (Senate cloture vote fails 57-42); 140
CONG. REC. S8844 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (Senate cloture vote fails 53-46); 140 CONG.
REC. S8524 (daily ed. July 12, 1994) (Senate cloture vote fails 53-47).
83. See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?:
FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 13-16 (1997) (discussing changed Senate
rules as an important factor contributing to expanded use of filibuster); Catherine Fisk &
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 201-05 (1997) (explaining
rise of the "stealth" filibuster; contending that a major cause was Senate leadership's
decision to allow other floor business to move forward while cloture proceedings are
separately pursued; and reporting that number of cloture votes has increased steadily in
each decade since 1960s as Senators filibuster on a broad range of domestic and foreign
policy issues).
84. Industrial unions have at times sought to coordinate the bargaining occurring
in different units in order to restore some of the economic leverage that they have lost
through decentralized bargaining. For instance, when several plant-wide bargaining units
propose that their contracts should all expire on the same date, they are reestablishing the
possibility of a simultaneous strike. See United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298
HeinOnline  -- 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 82 1999
To Strike or Not to Strike
paper manufacturing understand that in order to protect and improve their
terms and conditions of employment they must become more aggressive
and sophisticated about building alliances with others, criticizing
management operations, and reaching out to the media, then solidarity
might be easier to achieve. It is, however, a real challenge to secure such
commitments from workers at the front end through rational persuasion.
In our nonparticipatory television age, when "bowling alone"" is a
metaphor for the withering of communitarian habits of thought, workers
will not readily put their jobs and family security on the line. There is
even less reason to believe that workers are prepared to take such risks
in the absence of an immediate or imminent economic crisis.
And yet, the most compelling aspect of this book is the portrayal of
a spirit and energy that emerges from the workers themselves. Through
the words of individual men and women, Getman shows us that
empowerment really does occur in this setting. The Wednesday night
meetings at the union hall began as information sharing sessions but came
to feature songs and poetry readings by workers as well as inspirational
appearances by outsiders ranging from Amy Carter to Jesse Jackson. 6
These weekly meetings had a bonding and emotionally intensifying effect
for workers and members of the larger community. A semi-formal "body
F.2d 873, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that union's proposal for common expiration
date was a mandatory subject of bargaining, and it was lawful for the union to press the
proposal to impasse.).
Such coordinated bargaining tactics have their pitfalls. As a legal matter, the Board
or courts may characterize them as efforts to achieve multi-unit bargaining, which
amounts to an unlawful insistence on expanding the scope of each bargaining unit. See
Douds v. International Longshoremen'sAss'n, 241 F.2d 278,283 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding
that scope of bargaining unit is not a mandatory subject, hence it is unlawful for union to
insist on expanding unit to include other locations); Utility Workers Local 111, 203
N.L.R.B. 230, 240 (1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1974) (concluding that unions'
withholding agreements for each bargaining unit until identical terms were offered to all
other units was unlawful bad faith bargaining). For thoughtful discussion of the tension
between coordinated bargaining and multi-unit bargaining, see Alexander Colvin,
Rethinking Bargaining Unit Determination: Labor Law and the Structure of Representation
in a Changing Workplace, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 419 (1998); Milton C. Regan,
Jr., Note, Multi-Unit Collective Bargaining: Autonomy and Dependence in Liberal
Thought, 72 GEO. L.J. 1369 (1984). Moreover, as a practical matter, employers may
respond to coordinated bargaining approaches with differential strategies of their own that
will have divisive effects on worker unity. As Getman explains, International Paper
responded to labor unrest in this instance by locking out workers at one plant while hiring
permanent replacements at three others. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 24, 41.
85. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65, 68-75 (1995) (discussing decline of participatory civic and social
organizations in United States).
86. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 90-96.
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count"' revealed that during the strike more than 800 members of Local
14-almost everyone who remained out of work-were actively
involved doing something. Rank-and-file members helped run the food
bank, counseled workers with family problems, spoke about the strike at
public meetings around New England, walked the picket line, raised
money, wrote letters to corporations and government officials, and
investigated environmental issues. In addition to displaying individual
strengths and sharing newly discovered talents with one another, the
workers developed a perspective on their battle with International Paper
as part of a larger struggle for economic justice involving workers and
activists nationwide. 89
The following descriptions of two workers are illustrative and
typical. Roland Samson had worked twenty years in the mill and had
never been active in the union. He became an articulate spokesman in the
union's outreach program, spreading the strikers' message across the
state. His wife found him to be:
[A] happier, less tense, calmer, more relaxed person than he
had been before the strike. Roland was always a background
person, but during the strike his whole personality changed. He
learned to enjoy people, that he didn't have to be afraid of
them, that they wouldn't bite his head off if he spoke to them.
I used to ask, how was your day. He would just growl. But
the strike gave us a lot to talk about. We really shared our lives
.... And even though financially things were tight, it wasn't
important.90
Roland himself came belatedly to recognize he was a different person:
My kids told me I had changed and my wife told me I had
changed. And I didn't believe them until I started looking at
myself a little closer, and I had changed. I wasn't
temperamental anymore. I calmed down and became more
sensible, and that kind of stunned me. 9'
Louise Parker came from a family of International Paper employees who
had long been unsympathetic to the union. She began chairing the food
87. See id. at 93.
88. Of the 1200 original strikers, some 300 opted for retirement, see id. at 93;
thus, some 90% of those remaining on strike were actively engaged.
89. See id. at 90, 123.
90. Id. at 114.
91. Id.
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bank committee, and in that capacity she organized a large and successful
operation involving both distributors and wholesalers. She also built upon
her country music background to develop a repertoire of union songs that
she performed at meetings, rallies, and marches.'
One could regard the book's series of worker self-portraits as a
romantic post-hoc offset for the losses they have suffered. I do not think
that is accurate. The workers' own perceptions, and those of family and
community members, are too pervasive and articulate to be dismissed as
after-the-fact rationalizations. One could also see this as a kind of false
consciousness, workers riding the rhetorical wave of the "great struggle"
without understanding its dire consequences or even its hopelessness.
Again I think not. As Getman observes, some workers and most Local
14 leaders, even at the height of their power, had few illusions about the
strength of the opposition or the length of the odds against them.9 Yet
ten years later, amidst understandably profound feelings of bitterness and
loss, former Local 14 members were still fighting to get the union back
into the plant and many others retained a powerful sense of how
relationships had been transformed and new identities established. 9
Would it have been possible to foster this kind of individual
empowerment and collective strength among International Paper workers
without a strike? I am not at all sure it would. In legal terms, it is
possible for a union to let a collective bargaining agreement expire, refuse
to accede to management's concessionary demands, and continue to work
without a contract while initiating at least some of the tactical approaches
developed by the Jay strikers.9 But Getman points out that under the
law, International Paper could have unilaterally implemented its proposal,
imposing lost holidays, job classification changes, and the elimination of
some 300 jobs through subcontracting.' Those lawful moves would
92. See id. at 78-79.
93. See id. at 124.
94. See id. at 200, 213-14.
95. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 494-95 (1960)
(holding that union that implements economic pressure tactics against employer does not
per se violate duty to bargain in good faith even if the pressure tactics are themselves
unprotected activity); see also Cramton & Tracy, supra note 80, at 669-71 (discussing
unions' increased willingness to have workers remain on the job after contract expires,
often combined with in-plant strategies such as work-to-rule or slowdown).
96. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 39. Once a bargaining impasse is reached, an
employer may unilaterally implement changes in working conditions consistent with the
offers it made during negotiations. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 n.12 (1962);
Atlas Tack Corp., 226 N.L.R.B. 222, 227 (1976), enforced, 559 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir.
1977). While unilateral implementation would not be permitted if the employer's
bargaining proposals had been so extreme as to constitute bad faith, courts of appeals and
the Board have been reluctant to pass critical judgment on an employer's tough bargaining
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likely anger members enough to force a strike. Moreover, and this I take
as Getman's implicit message, workers do not generate the psychic
energy, they will not risk the human investment that occurred in Jay,
unless they have first opened the door to such a commitment by putting
their economic status on the line.
Part of what has made the strike such a powerful force in labor
relations is this synergy between economic sacrifice and psychological
reformation. Although strikes are initiated to pursue certain expressed
economic objectives, the continuation of a strike may well involve a series
of transformative events in which workers who have challenged existing
managerial authority reaffirm or develop bonds of mutual support and
solidarity, and in the process change their individual identities. 97
Industrial and social psychologists agree that strikes often fulfill this
function as a psychological crucible, although they have only begun to
understand the dynamics of how group members alter their priorities and
mental outlook during the crisis period. 98
Unions too have long recognized that strikes serve important
solidarity and loyalty-reinforcing functions quite apart from their success
or failure in economic terms. 9 Indeed, the revitalization of individual
demands. See, e.g., Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v. NLRB, 938 F.2d 284, 288,
290 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (observing "the courts have held that the Act precludes almost any
argument that a particular bargaining position constitutes an unfair labor practice per se,"
and holding that employer's bargaining demands were lawful where they "did not propose
to strip the union of its collective bargaining function"); Reichhold Chems., Inc., 288
N.L.R.B., 69, 71 (1988), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Teamsters Local 515
v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1053 (1991) (holding
that employer acts lawfully so long as its bargaining demands do not go so far as to
deprive the union of any "voice whatsoever concerning any facet of the employment
relationship," thereby leaving "the union and employees with substantially fewer rights
and protection than they would have had if they had never gone to the bargaining table").
97. See generally BRECHER, supra note 72, at 233-63.
98. See, e.g., JEAN HARTLEY ET AL., STEEL STRIKE: A CASE STUDY IN
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1983) (reporting that participative decisionmaking during a strike
by 10,000 British steelworkers was able to subdue internal opposition, and that the
volunteer strikers' organization was characterized by strong group identity, solidarity, and
mutual trust notwithstanding substantial disagreements as to strategy); Ross Stagner &
Boaz Eflal, Internal Union Dynamics During a Strike: A Quasi-Experimental Study, 67 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 37, 37-44 (1982) (finding that workers on strike report more
willingness to participate in union activities, assess the union and its leadership more
favorably, and evaluate the benefit package more highly after the strike). See generally
Stephen Bluen, The Psychology of Strikes, 9 INT'L REV. INDUS. & ORG. PSYCHOL. 113,
128-32 (1994) (reviewing literature on the psychological processes that develop during
course of strikes, and concluding that while these processes exist they are not well
understood).
99. See, e.g., Norman Pearlstine, Rallying the Ranks: UAW Uses GM Strike to
'Educate' Workers, Pull Together Factions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1970, at 1, 23
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commitments and mutual trust may leave workers feeling positive about
union participation even when a strike has not advanced their material
welfare."' It has become harder, however, for unions to invoke or rely
on the psychological benefits accompanying a strike when the economic
cost is not merely a failure to further workers' strike-related material
objectives, but rather the annihilation of job security that occurs when
strikers are permanently replaced or facilities closed.'' With slim
chances for economic success and high downside risks, unions since 1980
have felt a new urgency to develop meaningful solidarity-affirming
alternatives for workers involved in mature bargaining relationships."
The corporate campaign can be seen in part as a response to this
challenge. In mobilizing workers on a number of different fronts, such
a campaign provides diverse opportunities for participation and
empowerment. At the same time, the campaign may educate workers
regarding the role played by their corporate employer in the larger
sociopolitical structure."
Ultimately, however, corporate campaigns like strikes have economic
objectives; they are aimed at generating sufficient pressure so that the
targeted employer will offer substantial labor relations changes if the
union will discontinue its effort.t" In this regard, unions appear to
have achieved only modest successes using corporate campaigns as a
(reporting union leadership's belief that a long strike can "foster union loyalty and pull
together various rank-and-file factions by uniting them against a common enemy" and by
reinforcing links between current struggle and those of earlier decades). Long strikes may
also ease intra-union pressures by reducing rank-and-file members' expectations over time
until they become consistent with what the firm is able to pay and what union leaders are
able to negotiate. See Orley Ashenfelter & George E. Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade
Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 35, 35-49 (1969); Pearlstine,
supra.
100. See Gallagher & Gramm, supra note 69, at 82 (discussing why strike activity
may be rational if it fulfills social motives or collective goals even if it does not further
a worker's economic well-being).
101. In addition to hiring permanent replacements, companies facing economic
difficulties may be more likely to close marginally efficient plants at which workers are
on strike. See generally Freedman & Fulmer, supra note 69, at 44. As Getman
recognizes in the International Paper setting, employees at such marginal facilities are less
willing to participate in militant collective activity that risks triggering a mass layoff or
plant shutdown. See GETMAN, supra note 5, at 55-56.
102. Union organizing drives are another vehicle for developing bonds of solidarity
and individual commitment; organizing campaigns, however, cannot serve these purposes
for workers who are already unionized but are uninterested in collective participation.
103. See RACHLEFF, supra note 72, at 110 (discussing campaigns' educative
function for workers); Jarley & Maranto, supra note 40, at 506-07 (discussing use of
various nontraditional participatory tactics).
104. See DEVELOPING NEW TACTICS, supra note 39, at 1-3; Jarley & Maranto,
supra note 40, at 508.
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strike substitute, though empirical results after little more than a decade
remain incomplete.Iw5 Further, corporate campaigns in the bargaining-
related setting have not escaped the corrosive effects of intra-union
conflict. Most bargaining-related campaigns stem from employer
demands for concessions, and tensions between international leaders and
local union members about whether or to what extent to accede to
employer demands have spilled over into disagreements about the scope
and intensity of the actual campaign."° Until such disagreements are
minimized, it is difficult to envision how corporate campaigns can
contribute significantly to the revitalization of solidarity among unionized
workers.
Efforts by organized labor and rank-and-file workers to develop
practical participatory alternatives to the strike bring us back to Professor
Getman's tale. Accepting arguendo Getman's contention that the workers
in Jay were genuinely empowered even as they experienced a devastating
economic defeat, his narrative leaves us in search of a larger strategic
framework. Can a series of strikes like the one at Jay educate and
galvanize enough workers to make the labor movement a force-a threat
to managerial elites as it was in the 1930s and 1940s? Can the kind of
transformative events that occurred in Jay take place without utilizing a
strike weapon that seems almost hopelessly self-destructive in immediate
economic terms? Further, it is not sufficient for workers to be
collectively animated for a brief period only to revert to a disengaged
status." 7 With or without strikes as a triggering mechanism, can
energies and talents such as those developed among the members of Local
14 remain intact over an extended period in the absence of a larger
105. The database compiled by Jarley & Maranto includes three disputes in which
the parties reached a contract settlement within months after the union made its corporate
campaign public, and two others in which a contract settlement was reached a year or
more into the campaign. See Jarley & Maranto, supra note 40, at 510. As the authors
point out, however, it is difficult to know whether the same or comparable results would
have been achieved in the absence of the campaign. See id. at 510 n.8. The authors
conclude that three of the five contract settlements were due primarily to events outside
the scope of the campaigns. See id. at 512.
106. See id. at 517-18 (reporting that a number of bargaining-related campaigns
were instigated principally by local unions and did not receive the full financial or moral
support of national union leadership).
107. Some studies have indicated that the transformative impact of a strike may
wear off after a relatively short time period. See HARTLEY ET AL., supra note 98, at 157-
58 (reporting that workers had strong feelings of disappointment and/or pride shortly after
strike ended, but that over longer term many workers simply wanted to forget that the
strike had happened); Stagner & Eflal, supra note 98, at 43 (reporting that strikers' high
assessment of leadership performance and benefits secured during strike disappears after
seven months).
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economic crisis that disrupts faith in our autonomy-celebrating and
individual rights-based regime?
Getman does not attempt to answer these questions in his book. But
apart from being a dramatic human story that is well told, his narrative
forces us to confront some painful tensions within the modem labor
movement. Because the book presents a tantalizing picture of the
potential for a renewed and self-consciously empowered workers'
movement, it leaves us with a sense that confronting these tensions is
worth the candle.
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